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Abstract
Not only but particularly in terms of labor migration policy Germany and 
Canada are widely perceived as being situated at opposite ends of the spec-
trum. Whereas Canada has for a long time been enjoying a reputation of being 
one or even the role model for countries seeking to develop a flexible and 
welcoming immigration scheme that is nonetheless responsive to shortages 
and demands of specific sectors of the national labor market, the German 
system has been suffering from the suspicion of being not only structurally 
hostile towards immigrants but also of featuring a structural one-sidedness in 
terms of its steering, control and recruitment instruments. Against the back-
ground of major immigration reforms in the segment of highly skilled labor 
migration in both countries the paper describes and analyzes the core elements 
of these recent policy reforms, arguing that Canada and Germany as of 2013 
increasingly display more similarities than differences in their high-skilled labor 
immigration policy. Both countries have departed from extreme and one-sided 
steering approaches and now run ‘hybrid systems’ that aim at making use of 
the advantages of different steering and recruitment approaches.
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1.  Introduction: Labor migration policy in Canada and 
Germany: Opposite ends of the spectrum?
Canada and Germany constitute – at least as far as public perception is 
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in particular with regard to national schemes to attract highly skilled 
migrants. The Canadian approach, which fĳ irst and foremost is based on a 
point system, is widely appreciated as a flexible, welcoming and efffĳ icient 
tool to attract highly qualifĳ ied migrants from across the world. Jacoby (2010, 
p. 3) describes the Canadian point system as having “become a lodestar in 
international discussions of immigration – a model and an inspiration for 
policymakers around the world seeking to recruit high-skilled migrants 
for the sake of national competitiveness.” The popularity of Canada as an 
efffĳ icient labor recruiting country has also spread in Europe. Academics and 
policy-makers in Germany are among those who joined the camp of the 
fans of Canada some years ago. In its fĳ irst and fĳ inal report1 the offfĳ icial state-
funded Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration (Expert 
Council on Migration and Integration) (2004, p. 171, my translation) empha-
sized that countries that established immigration point systems in the past 
(particularly Canada, but also Australia and New Zealand) act politically 
reasonably and clear-sightedly, because the “straightforwardness and at the 
same time high functionality, the comparatively modest bureaucratic costs 
and […] the flexibility, which makes this instrument particularly responsive 
to recent changes on the labor market” would explain to a large extent why 
countries with such systems outperform other countries with regard to 
the average level of migrant skills. Shachar (2006, p. 129) even goes as far 
as arguing that the “Canadian point system […] represents an almost ideal 
example of how a smaller-economy jurisdiction can use immigration policy 
to establish a signifĳ icant share of the overall worldwide intake of highly 
skilled migrants, even when it must directly compete with a neighboring 
economic giant like the United States.” In German parliamentary debates 
about labor migration and shortage of workers it has meanwhile become 
commonplace to refer to Canada and the Canadian point system with 
praise and admiration.2
Germany on the other hand is at least in the public perception the op-
posite of Canada and has unfortunately become quite infamous for being 
a notoriously passive, narrow-minded and restrictive country in terms 
of labor migration in general and of its attempts to become an attractive 
destination country for skilled and highly skilled migrants (from non-EU 
countries) in particular. In an international survey among business execu-
tives, conducted 2012 on behalf of the World Competitiveness Yearbook, 
German respondents – in comparison to executives in most other OECD 
countries – very often expressed that the German “immigration laws 
prevent their company from employing foreign labour” (OECD, 2013, p. 
120) because of their restrictiveness and inflexibility. In a statement for 
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the Committee on Internal Afffairs of the German Bundestag, one of the 
most prominent legal scholars in the fĳ ield of migration and asylum law, 
Daniel Thym (2012, p. 3, my translation), reports that despite the recent 
comprehensive and liberal reforms “even on international scientifĳ ic confer-
ences […] many colleagues act on the assumption that Germany regulates 
economic migration restrictively”.
The above depicted diverging images of the German and Canadian 
skilled labor migration regime build the foundation for contrasting the 
public and political perception of both countries concerning the general 
political approach towards labor migration with the respective policies 
in place to attract highly skilled migrants. The following considerations 
thus largely ignore the respective political discourses and instead focus 
on the description and comparative analysis of a specifĳ ic segment of labor 
migration policy. The analysis also needs to block out many other aspects 
of immigration and integration policies such as naturalization, asylum and 
refugee policy, anti-discrimination policy, family reunion or integration 
measures.3 In this paper, the sole common reference point when comparing 
Canada and Germany is the development of the respective approaches of 
screening and selecting highly skilled migrants who in the case of Canada 
can immigrate and settle right from the start or in the case of Germany 
are fĳ irst granted access on a temporary basis with the possibility to get a 
permanent residence after a certain period of time. Given the very recent 
changes in both countries it is furthermore not possible to say much about 
the desired efffects of the respective new measures. This applies even more 
as volume and composition of immigration also depend on the supply side. 
For the German case it is also necessary to clarify that citizens of member 
states of the European Union are not subject to any German immigration 
legislation since they enjoy freedom of movement and have a (nearly) 
unlimited right to migrate to and live in any EU member state. 
After briefly introducing a typology of recruitment schemes in Part 2, 
which is thought to be needed as an analytical template, Part 3 provides 
a brief review of the main elements of each country’s system of highly 
skilled labor recruitment and indicates the diffferent starting points and 
initial trajectories of both countries. Based on this, Part 4 highlights recent 
policy developments in Germany and Canada and provides the necessary 
empirical material to support the hypothesis of a convergence process in 
the policy dimension. Finally, in Part 5 some preliminary considerations 




CMS 2014, VOL. 2, NO. 1
2.  Employer-based programs, occupation-driven 
schemes, human capital-approaches: A typology of 
labor migration schemes
In order to support the hypothesis that the Canadian and the German labor 
immigration policy systems, which have for a long time been perceived 
as very diffferent in structure and often even as structurally too diffferent 
for any approximation, are now converging towards a hybrid system, it is 
necessary to analyze both cases under the same analytical framework. 
While the past years have seen an increase in public approaches to attract 
highly skilled migrants, various scholars have been striving to develop a 
systematic and relatively general framework to categorize and compare 
these migrant recruitment schemes. The most widespread approach to 
classify diffferent state approaches to recruit labor migrants is to distinguish 
between demand- and supply-driven systems: whereas the central feature 
of the fĳ irst approach is that “the initiative for the migration comes from the 
employer, who has a perceived need for a worker with a particular skill”, the 
second approach refers “to situations in which a host country advertises 
its willingness to take applications for immigration directly from potential 
candidates, independently of a specifĳ ic job offfer” […]; “candidates [in such 
systems] are usually assessed for admission on the basis of characteristics 
deemed to facilitate labor market integration such as language profĳiciency, 
educational attainment, age, work experience, the presence of family in 
the host country […]” (Chalofff & Lemaître, 2009, p. 17).4 Another and for 
the purpose of this paper heuristically more useful diffferentiation comes 
from Papademetriou & O‘Neill (2004, p. 9) who propose a more fĳ ine-grained 
approach identifying three ways to screen and select labor migrants: 
1. Employment-based systems admit “workers who have been hired by 
duly registered corporate entities for a specifĳ ic job” and make admission 
fĳ irst and foremost dependent on the question whether an applicant has 
found an employer and signed a work contract5,
2. Occupation-driven mechanisms admit “people who are qualifĳ ied in oc-
cupations that the government decides are in short supply”, capitalizing 
on the identifĳ ication of labor shortages in specifĳ ic occupations and/or 
sectors of the national economy and establishing ‘fast track schemes’ 
with eased access for persons with qualifĳ ications in these occupations 
and/or sectors without necessarily requiring a work contract.
3. Fundamentally diffferent from these approaches are human capital 
schemes that usually not only refrain from any built-in requirement 
of arranged employment but are also not restricted to specifĳ ic occupa-
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tions and/or sectors of the economy. This philosophy of screening and 
selecting applicants is rather based on an assessment of the observable 
characteristics of any individual applicant. A very popular method to 
do this assessment is the allocation of points.
3.  Employer-based vs. human capital-driven: German 
and Canadian strategies of labor recruitment 
The above-mentioned typology of labor migration schemes easily shows that 
for a long time Germany and Canada have indeed followed fundamentally 
diffferent tracks with regard to labor immigration policy in general and 
to the recruitment of highly skilled migrants in particular. A very brief 
comparison of the institutional backbones, that have been forming the 
labor migration systems in both countries, indicates that the diffferences 
between the very principles of labor recruitment were not of gradual but 
of categorical nature.
Germany has a long experience of recruiting labor migrants. Between 
1955 and 1973 more than four million immigrants, who were recruited 
under the assumption that their stay in Germany would be of temporary 
nature and thus politically and publically were addressed as “guest workers”, 
came to Germany (Triadafĳ ilopoulos & Schönwälder, 2006, p. 1-19). This 
immigration and the subsequent processes of family reunifĳ ication are still 
inf luential for patterns of immigration to contemporary Germany. The 
German recruitment effforts seemed to be inevitable at that time in view 
of a signifĳ icant labor supply problem which itself emerged out of a bundle 
of reasons: increasing demand as a consequence of economic growth, the 
reduction of labor supply induced by the establishment of armed forces, 
the building of the Berlin wall, the expansion of secondary and higher 
education which delayed the labor market participation of younger persons 
and fĳ inally successful effforts of trade unions to reduce the number of hours 
worked per week which had the same detrimental efffect on labor supply. 
After nearly two decades of active labor migration policy Germany closed 
the door to ‘third country’ immigration in 1973, categorically refused to be 
a ‘country of immigration’ and only started to carefully change its stance 
towards labor immigration at the end of the 1990s.
In Germany the attraction of highly skilled migrants from outside the 
European Union was traditionally either based on the provisions of the 
ordinance on exemptions from the recruitment ban (Anwerbestoppaus-
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nahmeverordnung – ASAV) or on the employment ordinance (Beschäfti-
gungsverordnung – BeschV) respectively, which replaced the ASAV after 
the enactment of the immigration law of 2005. These ordinances served 
as a kind of exception list for circumstances under which the recruitment 
ban of 1973, which bars the recruitment of labor migrants from outside the 
European Union, could be abrogated (Schönwälder, 2013). For most of these 
exceptional cases, however, the respective conditions were formulated in a 
very strict way with a high level of discretionary power for the immigration 
bureaucracy with the result that Germany experienced a quasi-zero labor 
migration until the late 1990s. The German Green Card of 2000, a special 
arrangement for third country nationals with professional expertise in the 
fĳ ield of information and communication technology6, and the immigration 
act of 2005 did also not fundamentally change the very nature of the Ger-
man system (OECD, 2013, p. 64). Both schemes, the Green Card and the im-
migration act, only provided an increasing list of exceptions to the rule and 
cautiously liberalized the conditions for recruitment and labor immigration 
instead of changing the underlying rationale and rules. The common feature 
of ASAV, the Green Card and the options codifĳied in the immigration act was 
the centrality of the requirement of a work contract (SVR, 2011, p. 71), which 
turned the German system into a model for an employer-based recruitment 
model, even though some provisions of the BeschV additionally required an 
afffĳ iliation to a specifĳ ic sector of the economy or a particular educational 
degree, thereby including sector-specifĳ ic or occupation-driven aspects.
The history of Canadian labor immigration policy could not be more 
diffferent. Its self-understanding as a country of immigration which for many 
reasons is in need of and welcomes permanent immigration belongs to the 
country‘s political and societal DNA (Reitz, 2013, p. 154). This positive stance 
towards permanent immigration, moreover, seems to be disconnected from 
the business cycle and also holds for times of economic problems or even 
hardship. Even during the recent economic downturn no serious and/or 
influential political and societal voices arguing for reduced immigration 
emerged. The immigration outlook series of the OECD constantly ranks 
Canada as one of the top receivers of permanent immigration relative to 
its population.
Given the diffferences in the political and historical appreciation of im-
migration policy it cannot be surprising that the technical implementation 
of labor migration policy in Canada followed an entirely diffferent approach 
than in Germany. In the same way as German labor migration policy has 
long been fĳ ixed exclusively on employer-based considerations, the Cana-
dian philosophy of screening and selecting immigrants – particularly as 
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institutionalized in the Federal Skilled Worker Program (FSWP) – reflected 
the human capital approach. Even though the FSWP is not the only labor 
migration scheme to Canada7, it is a very or even the most important one. 
Especially after the major reform of 2002 (Immigration and Refugee Protec-
tion Act – IRPA) this scheme solely relied on the human capital approach 
(Langenfeld & Waibel, 2013 and O’Shea, 2009). Whereas Germany used 
the existence of a work contract that secured and guaranteed successful 
labor market integration as the central necessary (but not sufffĳ icient) condi-
tion for granting access, Canada pursued a strategy that only checked the 
characteristics of the individual applicant and barely took into account the 
specifĳ ic needs of the domestic labor market. It relied on the assumption 
that in the long run highly qualifĳ ied immigrants will fĳ ind their way into the 
diffferent realms of society, including the labor market, anyway (Hailbronner 
& Koslowski, 2008, p. 7).
4.  The triumph of hybrid models and a process of 
convergence in Canada and Germany
Recently both the German and Canadian government introduced major 
reforms of their migration policy instruments, reflecting a change in the 
general strategy on how best to attract high skilled migrant workers. These 
reforms signifĳ icantly changed the traditional principles in both countries 
but remain barely known on the respective other side of the Atlantic so far. 
Whereas in German media and politics the Canadian point system of 1967 
is still being praised for – among other things – its openness and flexibility8 
ministerial instructions in 2008 tentatively removed the ‘human capital 
core’ of the system (which is defĳ ined above as exclusive consideration of 
individual characteristics such as education, age, work experience etc.) and 
severely restricted access to the system by installing and preceding two 
‘entry conditions’: in order to be considered as applicant to the point system 
at all, potential immigrants must now prove a job offfer or job experience 
in a specifĳ ic, state-defĳ ined shortage occupation.9 Belonging to a specifĳ ic 
occupational group is not a completely new feature in the Federal Skilled 
Worker Program (FSWP). Before the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA) had removed occupational points entirely from the system, 
occupation was just one selection criterion among others. The ministe-
rial instructions of 2008 turned occupation into “a preliminary screen”, 
stipulating that only after “applications [have] pass[ed] through the “gate” 
established by the ministerial instructions they continue to be assessed 
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against the IRPA human capital factors” (O’Shea, 2009, p. 22). This means 
that unless applicants “have Canadian job offfers in hand, new applicants 
who do not qualify for the posted list of occupations in demand are not 
eligible for processing; their fĳ iles are returned and their application fees 
refunded” (Picot & Sweetman, 2012, p. 20).
These conditions also constitute the essence of the new FSWP that 
came into efffect in spring 2013: just in order to get to the assessment stage 
candidates must pass one of three possible ‘gates’: 1) having a record of 
one year’s work in one of the (now) 24 designated occupations; 2) hav-
ing a qualifying offfer of employment; 3) being eligible through the PhD 
stream for international students or graduates who are or were enrolled in 
a PhD program of a Canadian university. After having passed through this 
fĳ ilter candidates are still assessed according to a revised points system. In 
addition to this, a minimum language requirement (Canadian Language 
Benchmark (CLB) 7) was introduced which categorically excludes applicants 
without sufffĳ icient language profĳiciency in English or French. In the older 
versions of FSWP the disadvantage of limited language profĳiciency could 
have been compensated by a high scoring among the other selection factors. 
For 2015 the Canadian government plans the introduction of an “Ex-
pression of Interest (EoI)” selection system similar to the ones already 
implemented in Australia and New Zealand. Both countries constitute 
the main countries of reference with regards to the advancement of Ca-
nadian recruitment schemes. An EoI serves as a kind of preliminary stage 
for applicants and enables the public and private sector of a particular 
immigration country to identify at an earlier stage those candidates who 
are deemed to have the potential to pass the thresholds of the latter phases 
of the selection process. Particularly the possibility to involve employers 
early in the process indicates the new emphasis of labor market suitability 
and shrinking relevance of classic human capital-based considerations. 
The trigger for this renunciation of the Canadian human capital-
tradition on the one hand was a massive backlog of applications within 
the FSWP10 that was meant to be reduced by the introduction of these 
new entry conditions. On the other hand the unsatisfactory labor market 
integration of highly-skilled immigrants in Canada and a resulting Brain 
Waste (see O‘Shea, 2009, Reitz, 2013; Picot & Sweetman, 2012) may have 
been contributing to a further emphasis of the actual needs of the Canadian 
labor market in the system. As a matter of fact these ministerial instructions 
diversifĳ ied the Canadian steering principles by adding employer-based 
and occupation-driven considerations to the formerly one-sided Canadian 
human capital system with the result “that the program as a whole is now 
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more connected to labor market demand than was the case with the original 
IRPA scheme” (O‘Shea 2009, p. 22). What is more, the way the individual level 
of education is taken account of in the point system has changed. The new 
system makes the assessment of foreign educational credentials mandatory, 
thereby requiring checking for the comparative value of the degree obtained 
abroad. Against this background it is no overstatement to describe the 
Canadian development in the last decade as a comprehensive one. After 
the IRPA reform, the ministerial instructions of 2008 meant nothing less 
than a certain renunciation of human capital principles and a conversion 
to a mix of employer-based (arranged employment) and occupation-driven 
(work experience in certain occupational categories) steering, which indeed 
continued to make use of the principle of allocating points on the basis of 
human capital considerations, but just as a secondary fĳ ilter. 
The recent German history of labor immigration policy is by no means 
less comprehensive in content than the Canadian one. Milestones during the 
last fĳ ifteen years were the Green Card program that is widely appreciated as 
an important icebreaker for the political debate, which had previously been 
stuck for many years (Ette, 2003, p. 34; Jurgens, 2010, p. 345-355; OECD, 2013, 
p. 64). The German Green Card paved the way for the successor of the aliens’ 
act of 1991 – the immigration act of 2005 – that, despite receiving justifĳ iable 
criticism on single issues, is widely accepted as the fĳ irst systematic legal 
attempt to make Germany more attractive for an increasingly sought after 
global mobile elite. The last reform step in the area of labor migration so 
far was the implementation of the EU directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 
on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly skilled employment (so-called Blue Card). At least for 
the time being, the implementation of the directive can be interpreted as 
one further signifĳ icant step in a long process of liberalization of the labor 
migration rules that had entered into force with Germany’s immigration 
act in 2005. Conditions for obtaining the EU Blue Card are: a German, a 
recognized foreign or a comparable foreign higher education qualifĳ ication, 
evidence of an annual minimum gross salary of currently EUR 46.800 or in 
the case of an EU Blue Card being awarded to scientists, mathematicians 
and engineers, doctors and IT specialists evidence of a minimum gross 
salary of 36.200 €.11 The Blue Card is a temporary permit which can be 
converted into a permanent permit after 33 or (in case of German language 
skills) 21 months. What is worth noting in the way the German government 
implemented the directive is a generally “migrant friendly” (Thym, 2012, 
p. 6, my translation) and generous approach. This applies to the general 
abolishment of a labor market test for Blue Card holders, wage ceilings at 
66
COMPARATIVE MIGRATION STUDIES
CMS 2014, VOL. 2, NO. 1
the lowest edge of what the EU has defĳ ined as minimum requirements and 
unlimited labor market access for family members of Blue Card holders 
(Langenfeld & Waibel, 2013). The implementation of the European Blue 
Card directive thus resulted in a new round of liberalization of the existing 
system of employer-based and occupation-driven labor migration. Yet, 
these changes remained within the limitations of that system, i.e. without 
changing its structural foundations.
Of greater relevance for comparing Canada and Germany and arguing 
for the existence of a process of structural convergence is an entirely new 
feature of the German immigration system. Even though not stipulated 
by the EU directive it nonetheless fundamentally changed the very nature 
of the formerly one-sided employer-based system (Strunden & Schubert, 
2012; Steller, 2013; Langenfeld & Waibel, 2013): The new article 18c of the 
immigration act in its version of August 2012 introduced for the fĳ irst time 
in the history of German immigration legislation a residence permit for 
job-searching. This is not only a departure from the ‘No immigration 
without labor contract’-dogma, that in a nutshell has been the center of 
the German labor immigration philosophy for decades. It is also noth-
ing less than the introduction of a very basic, frugal and binary (yes/no) 
point system with just two accession criteria: an academic qualifĳ ication 
and adequate means of subsistence for the planned duration of the stay.12 
Thus, Germany now runs a labor migration system that still puts a heavy 
emphasis on employer-based steering principles, which is fĳ ine-tuned by 
occupation-driven considerations as the reduced wage requirements for 
certain shortage occupations laid out by the German implementation of the 
Blue Card directive indicate. Article 18c of the immigration act, however, 
added a new legal option, that leaves the German tradition of labor migra-
tion policy behind and instead carefully employs the Canadian principle 
of a human capital model. It uses individual characteristics such as level of 
education and the existence of sufffĳ icient fĳ inancial means for screening and 
selecting applicants. It is important to mention though that this new scheme 
remains closely linked to the so-far prevailing employer-based philosophy 
since access is only granted on a temporary basis (up to six months) until 
the migrant fĳ inds a job. He or she may then convert the temporary status 
into a permanent one.
A process of convergence on the modalities of recruitment schemes 
between Canada and Germany thus becomes apparent in the diversifĳication 
of the respective steering principles and the emergence of hybrid models 
(Papademetriou & Sumption, 2011) in both countries that tend to combine 
the screening and selecting mechanisms of diffferent labor migration policy 
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approaches. This is not the only development that indicates an increasing 
convergence between both countries. What furthermore deserves attention 
but is beyond the scope of this paper and cannot be explained in greater de-
tail is the growing importance of the Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker 
Program (TFWP)13 which in the same way as the EU Blue Card directive 
fĳ irst provides only a temporary permit which at a later point of time can 
be converted into a permanent one. This paper, however, concentrates 
only on the steering principles for recruitment schemes of highly skilled 
migrants. Both countries in this regard abolished a one-sided strategy and 
today rather aim at a f lexible combination of elements of all three basic 
strategies – human capital, employer-based and occupation-driven. In 
this regard Canada and Germany are coming from very diffferent starting 
points, the ‘pure’ human capital-approach in one country and the similarly 
one-sided employer based-model in the other, but are now in a process of 
convergence and approximation. 
Considerations about possible changes of migration policy do not 
imply full congruence between the countries discussed here as the mere 
respective quantitative dimension of labor or economic migration indicates: 
Whereas in Canada about two-thirds of the total immigration intake (about 
249.000 persons) come under the category of economic immigration (about 
156.000 persons), for which the FSWP is just one (albeit the most important) 
element, labor migration to Germany constitutes a much smaller piece 
of the total immigration ‘pie’: In 2011 only 14 percent (about 37.000) of 
all immigrants from third countries registered in the central register of 
foreigners (about 266.000), which statistically covers immigrants with a 
minimum period of stay of three months and thus does not include seasonal 
workers, came as labor migrants. The new entry gates for highly qualifĳ ied 
non-EU citizens are not being used to a great extent so far (as also the 
monthly migration monitor of the Federal Offfĳice for Migration and Refugees 
indicates). The specifĳ ic situation of Germany being the most important net 
receiver of immigrants from other EU member states, however, aggravates 
the quantitative comparison of both countries. Although it is statistically 
impossible to detect the actual underlying motives of EU immigrants to 
Germany it has a lot to commend that a signifĳ icant share of the 500.000 EU 
migrants in 2011 came to Germany as labor migrants (SVR, 2012, p. 49-66). 
The free movement of EU-citizens, who are largely well educated (SVR, 2012, 
p. 99-104), to Germany thus serves de facto as a functional equivalent and 
complementation to recruitment schemes for highly skilled immigrants.
Whereas the numbers of high-skilled immigrants remain unequal so far, 
which, however, not only can be explained by the fact that Germany only 
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recently changed and opened its recruitment schemes (which apply to a 
rather small part of total migration to Germany), but also by the existence 
of a huge pool of mobile Europeans, which legally and statistically cannot 
be counted as ‘immigrants’ in the same way as third country nationals, the 
legal provisions in both countries show some tendencies of convergence. 
Canada diversifĳ ied its formerly one-sided human capital model by utilizing 
instruments known and proven in employer-based systems. The German 
system, that traditionally featured a structural one-sidedness due to its 
categorical requirement of a work contract for all labor migrants, largely 
remains an employer-based system since the core of the German system, the 
temporary options of article 18 immigration act and the ‘Blue Card options’ 
of article 19 continue to be bound to a work contract. Yet the new article 18 
c, which was not required to introduce by the EU Blue Card directive, added 
a second structural tier and thus resulted in an important diversifĳ ication 
and hybridization of the German portfolio of labor market schemes.
5.  Causes of congruence and an emerging debate about 
rapid policy changes
The market for highly skilled migrants is increasingly becoming an asym-
metrical market in the sense that power is shifted from the now mutually 
competing immigration states (demanders) to a mobile and highly skilled 
workforce (suppliers), which aggravates analyses of the interrelation be-
tween policy changes and their desired efffects and results in an institutional 
“race to the top” (Shachar, 2006). As far as the legal and institutional design 
of the approaches in Canada and Germany is concerned the diffferences 
are smaller than what could be assumed on the mere assessment of their 
respective reputation. In this process of convergence Germany undoubtedly 
went through greater changes than Canada, since in a rather short time it 
not only rigorously liberalized an existing employer-based labor migration 
scheme but also added an entirely new steering element based on human 
capital considerations to the overall set of measures to attract highly skilled 
migrants. This process resulted in a rather quick transformation of Germany 
from a country with a cautious and restrictive approach towards immigra-
tion policy as an instrument of labor market policy to a country that can 
be characterized by a new openness and generosity to labor migration. 
In a recent report on German labor immigration policy the OECD (2013, 
p. 15) came to a clear and unambiguous conclusion: “Recent reforms have 
put Germany among the OECD countries with the fewest restrictions on 
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labour migration for highly skilled occupations”, in fact “Germany’s policy 
for highly skilled migration is among the most open in the OECD.”
The assessment that something unexpected happened – and the claim 
that a process of convergence between Canada and Germany in the realm 
of migration policy is taking place undoubtedly belongs to this category 
– automatically raises the question of possible explanations. Particularly 
Germany’s transformation from a “reluctant” (Martin, 1994, p. 189-225) 
and “undeclared” (Thränhardt, 1995, p. 19-35) country of immigration to a 
country which according to the recent assessment of the OECD nowadays 
– at least as far as recruitment schemes for highly skilled are concerned 
– belongs to the liberal pioneers, demands further explanation. The theo-
retical literature on policy change is rich (see for many others Hall, 1993 
and Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993). In a recent overview on theoretical 
explanatory offfers for radical policy changes Rüb (2014, p. 13-15, my transla-
tion) diffferentiates between “external or internal shocks”, “evolutionary 
learning“ and “electorate-driven adjustment dynamics“. Particularly the 
notion of “evolutionary learning“ might serve as a fruitful starting point 
to dive into an explanation of why the development towards convergence 
took place, because this concept can easily be linked to the mentioned 
international trend towards the emergence of hybrid models of screening 
and selecting highly skilled migrants. The term “hybridization” generally 
describes a process of diversifĳ ication of state portfolios of labor migration 
policy in such a way that systems that initially were based exclusively on 
employer-based considerations are now combined with human capital 
elements of screening and selecting (and vice versa). The policy-variation 
that has been described and analyzed as signifĳ icant policy change for 
Germany (and to a lesser extent also for Canada) thus could be interpreted 
as part of a cross-country “tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the 
form of increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances“ 
(Drezner, 2001, p. 54). The common denominator of the here compared cases 
is an eclectic combination of diffferent steering principles and selection 
instruments.
The reasons for an observed growing approximation of national policies 
and institutions are a central topic in various neoinstitutionalist studies. 
As a prominent and fruitful explanation within this stream of literature 
serves the concept of institutional isomorphism, which is described in 
general terms in the spadework of DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p. 149) as a 
“constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other 
units that face the same set of environmental conditions“. The concept 
was originally developed for the analysis of processes within organiza-
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tions (“organizational fĳ ields”), but can nevertheless also be applied to the 
analysis of processes of political convergence (Holzinger & Knill, 2007, p. 
89). A ‘competitive’ version of isomorphism refers to adjustment processes 
triggered by market forces (see for such an account Shachar, 2013, p. 85-104). 
In contrast to this understanding “institutional isomorphism” analyses pro-
cesses of adjustment and convergence beyond market-based reactions and 
competitive imperatives and puts a stronger emphasis on the signifĳ icance 
of “political power and institutional legitimacy“ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
p. 150). Within the concept of institutional isomorphism three diffferent 
mechanisms need to be diffferentiated.14 The form of isomorphism that 
contains specifĳ ic importance for the case study of German and Canadian 
labor migration policy is mimetic isomorphism, understood as a specifĳ ic 
strategy chosen by organizations and/or states in order to cope with in-
security or ignorance and to create legitimacy for political decisions by 
imitating political action of other states. Applying this analytical concept 
allows for avoiding mere functionalist explanations which tend to explain 
adjustment processes mainly or exclusively as a result of increasing interna-
tional competition and a resulting similarity of societal conditions. Instead, 
political strategies for dealing with insecurity and creating legitimacy are 
used as the analytical focus. 
For this case study of labor migration policy the notion of institutional 
isomorphism is assumed to have greater explanatory power than a reference 
to market dynamics and resulting adjustments because of the fact that 
the overall efffectiveness of migration policies in general, including that of 
schemes to attract highly skilled immigrants, should not be exaggerated. 
A specifĳ ic design of selective immigration policies seems to be only loosely 
coupled with the political outcomes defĳ ined for this policy area, which 
are the number and the human capital of labor migrants. Ambiguity and 
insecurity with regards to the interdependencies between legal migra-
tion rules and actual immigration outcomes prevail. The impact of state 
migration policy on immigration patterns tends to be overestimated, well-
documented self-selective processes of immigrants point to the importance 
of general socio-economic (see for example Cohen, Haberfeld & Kogan, 2008, 
p. 185-201) and sociocultural conditions such as return on human capital, 
net wages, language and density of ethnic networks (see for example Boeri, 
Brücker, Docquier & Rapoport, 2012) in the decision of where to migrate. As 
the outcome of specifĳic policy options is hence vague, a policy of “modeling” 
and “mimetic behavior” turns out to be an attractive political option as 
“response to uncertainty“ (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151). In this process 
of policy isomorphism the real efffect of the policy measures is of secondary 
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importance since the main goal of the measure is the reduction of political 
uncertainty. The basic point of reference of this “model copying“ (Bommes, 
2006, p. 70) for the case study analyzed here is the idea of hybrid systems 
of labor migration policy which have (seemingly) the potential to combine 
the specifĳ ic (expected rather than proven) advantages of diffferent steering 
approaches. In the face of the impossibility to describe the volume and 
composition of the immigration population solely as a result of a specifĳ ic 
technique of screening and selecting and a corresponding chronic insecu-
rity, imitating and following international trends, as Germany did by the 
adoption of a point system and Canada did by re-implementing arranged 
employment and the afffĳiliation to a specifĳic sector of the economy as a main 
category for selection and plans to do by adopting EoI-systems, appears to 
be a particularly attractive political reaction. The reference to institutional 
practices in other countries – this is referred to as the “ritual aspect“ by 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983, p. 151) – promises to maintain or even increase the 
legitimacy of political reforms. In Germany the necessary implementation 
of the Blue Card directive provided a politically convenient window of 
opportunity for model copying in the shape of a hybridization of labor 
migration policy. In this time frame the sudden renunciation of a fĳ ixation 
on a work contract as conditio sine qua non for immigrating seemed to be 
manageable. In Germany this change furthermore was easy to legitimize as 
a possible solution to the problem that Germany for a long time seemingly 
attracted mainly low qualifĳ ied and therefore the ‘wrong’ kind of migrants.
Moreover, this discussion of German migration policy can be related 
to an emerging theoretical debate within political science in Germany. 
In two recent papers Rüb (2012; 2014) pointed to an increasingly puzzling 
phenomenon to be observed in Germany that he calls “rapid policy changes”. 
The most striking and publicly most debated examples for these changes 
took place in the realm of social and labor market policy (massive social 
cuts in welfare benefĳ its, enacted by a center-left government), energy 
policy (abandoning nuclear energy, enacted by a center-right government) 
and defense policy (abolition of compulsory military service, enacted by a 
center-right government). These political U-turns are particularly startling 
in Germany because the country has for a long time been perceived “in 
international comparative as well as in German policy-research as a proto-
type of a political regime, in which policy changes are unlikely and which 
notoriously leads to a backlog of reforms“ (Rüb, 2014, p. 3; my translation; 
see also the spadework on Germany by Katzenstein, 1987). These changes 
challenge political science to develop a new typology and taxonomy of rapid 
policy changes that have the analytical potential to explain the recent ac-
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cumulation of unexpected changes. The current history of migration policy 
may fĳ it very well into the list of policy fĳ ields that underwent such a change.
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Notes
1. After original plans to introduce a point system already with the immigration act of 2005 
were skipped and thus a key part of the mandate of the council, the setting of a maximum 
quota of labor migrants to be admitted, ceased to exist, the budgetary committee of the 
federal parliament withdrew all funds and thus de facto dissolved the council.
2. See for example the proposition 17/3862, discussed in the German Bundestag in November 
2010 and the proposition 16/8492 from March 2008. See for an analysis of the German 
parliamentary debate on this topic Schönwälder (2013, p. 273-286).
3. In most of these areas the two countries remain rather diffferent or processes of convergence 
are slow and unsteady. See e.g. Koopmans, Michalowski & Waibel (2012, p. 1202-1245).
4. A similar theoretic distinction is made by a recent study of the Berlin-Institut (2012, p. 
35-36) that diffferentiates between “human capital-oriented models” vs. “labor market-
driven methods” to emphasize the diffferent philosophies of Germany and Canada in the 
past and by Papademetriou & Sumption (2011, p. 2-3). Their diffferentiation of methods of 
“points-based selection” that are predicated on a “list of attributes or characteristics that 
[governments] deem important for prospective foreign workers to possess to be admitted” 
and “employer-led systems” that “rel[y] on employers to choose workers” largely corresponds 
to the distinction between supply- and demand-driven systems as proposed by Chalofff & 
Lemaître (2009).
5. Arranged employment is thus a necessary but not a sufffĳ icient condition for access.
6. Originally the government planned to attract up to 20.000 IT specialists. Particularly the 
economic downturn of the IT industry shortly after the launch of the Green Card severely 
reduced the demand for foreign workers, so that fĳ inally only about 15.000 work permits 
were issued.
7. Other important elements of the Canadian system of labor migration are the Provincial 
Nominee Program (PNP) that allows the Canadian provinces to nominate persons for 
immigrating to the respective province, the Canadian Experience Class (CEC), which eases 
access for persons who have already lived in Canada before, and the Temporary Foreign 
Worker Program (TFWP). 
8. See for a very benevolent analysis of the Canadian approach the study of the Berlin-Institut 
(2012).
9. The list of occupations contains mainly engineers and medical professionals. 
10. According to the offfĳ icial evaluation of the Federal Skilled Worker Program (CIC, 2010, p. 
3) some applicants had to wait up to six years for the fĳ inal handling of their application 
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with the consequence that “these processing times certainly make Canada a less attractive 
destination for potential immigrants” (O’Shea, 2009, p. 15).
11. Average starting salaries for young academics are reported to range between 30.000 € for 
architects or social pedagogues and more than 50.000 € for engineers. Given an average 
starting salary for all academics of 41.000 € the wage requirements of the Blue Card must be 
considered as moderate. It is further interesting to know that the initial annual minimum 
gross salary for obtaining a high-quality residence permit was above 80.000 € when the 
German immigration act for highly skilled immigrants fĳ irst entered into efffect in 2005. 
12. If a person is able to meet these two criteria he/she is allowed to look for a job in Germany 
for up to six months. In case of being successful his/her permit will be renewed, extended 
and if applicable converted into a permanent permit. Translated into the point-system logic, 
this implies a maximum number of two points needed for admission.
13. In her comparison of Spain and Canada Finotelli (2012, p. 1-18) particularly highlights the 
increasing relevance of the TFWP as new feature in the Canadian immigration system. The 
number of temporary foreign workers in Canada increased from less than 50.000 in 1988 to 
more than 210.000 in 2012 and is almost as high as the number of permanent immigrants 
(Worswick, 2013, p. 5).
14. In contrast to mimetic isomorphism coercive isomorphism describes a process when an 
organization is compelled to adopt structures or rules (through laws, regulations or accredi-
tation processes). Finally, normative isomorphism is associated with professional values. 
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